Abstract. CSP-OZ is an integrated formal method which combines the state-oriented method Object-Z with the process algebra CSP, thereby allowing a description of static as well as dynamic aspects of a system. Checking correctness of CSP-OZ speci cations can be done via a translation into (FDR-)CSP, on which automatic veri cation can be performed with the tool FDR if the resulting CSP process is not too large to be processed. This paper investigates how data abstraction techniques can be used to bring a translated speci cation within range of automatic veri cation.
Introduction
Recently, there is an emerging interest in speci cation techniques that combine speci cation methods for di erent views on a system. In particular, methods integrating static aspects (data) and dynamic aspects (behaviour) are investigated (see for example 17, 10, 22, 20] ). CSP- OZ 7] is a formal method that combines a method for the description of static aspects of systems, Object-Z 6] (an object-oriented extension of Z 21,24]), with a method for the speci cation of dynamic behaviour, the process algebra CSP 11, 18] . The general idea behind this integration is to augment the state-oriented Object-Z speci cation with the speci cation of behaviour in the style of CSP while maintaining a clear separation of the issues of data and behaviour. The combination has a uniform formal semantics in the style of CSP failures and divergences.
In this paper, we will be concerned with verifying CSP-OZ speci cations. The rst step in the veri cation of a given CSP-OZ speci cation will be a translation into CSP 1 , to be precise, into the CSP dialect of the model checker FDR (Failure-Divergence-Re nement 9]). This technique has been proposed in 8], extending previous ideas of 16, 19] to use FDR to check properties of (CSP-)Z speci cations. FDR-CSP is a combination of CSP with a functional language in the style of Haskell and Miranda. The functional language can be used to encode the Z data descriptions. Due to the possibly large data domain speci ed in the Object-Z part of a CSP-OZ speci cation, the resulting CSP process may however be too complex to be processed by FDR. This paper investigates the usefulness of data abstraction techniques to reduce the complexity of property checking on CSP-OZ speci cations. The general idea is to apply the framework of abstract interpretation 4] in the speci c setting of CSP-OZ. The use of abstraction techniques for veri cation has already been investigated for temporal-logic model checking 5, 1, 14] and is based on abstracting transition systems (the models for various speci cation formalisms) while preserving properties formulated in temporal logic. Techniques for directly constructing abstract transition systems from speci cations are given to avoid the construction of the (possibly large) concrete transition system at all. These techniques most often rely on choosing some abstract data domain and abstractly interpreting the operators in the program on this domain. Another application of abstract interpretation in veri cation is the construction of models from real software written in a programming language 3].
The work most closest to us is 2] which gives abstract interpretations for value-passing CCS where the correctness checks are based on the notion of testing. However, their abstraction results are formulated within the framework of Galois connections on transition systems, the semantic models of CCS. For a designer having written a speci cation in CCS, it is hard to understand the practical meaning of the result, it is formulated completely di erent than his speci cation. Furthermore, the obtained abstraction result cannot be the basis for further process algebraic manipulation. In the approach we present here, speci cations, correctness checks and abstraction results are formulated in the process algebra theory of CSP. Thus we have a uniform formalism for specication and veri cation. A designer using the abstraction technique does not have to understand the "lower" semantic level of transition systems. Since the abstraction results are formulated within CSP theory, they can for instance be further combined (compositionality) or projected down to the concrete level. Furthermore, due to the clear separation of data and behaviour in a CSP-OZ speci cation, data abstraction only requires local changes of the CSP-OZ speci cation (or directly of the CSP process obtained by translation): changing the Z part by replacing concrete data domains/operations by abstract ones. We neither change the structure of the process, nor the interpretation of CSP operators. This enables us to use FDR without any additional modi cations to the program or the model checking algorithm.
The paper is structured as follows: we start with a brief introduction of CSP-OZ and the translation into CSP. The translation maintains the separation into data and behaviour. Hence the resulting CSP processes have a quite speci c structure, which we call CSP-OZ form. Section 3 discusses data abstraction for CSP processes in CSP-OZ form and Section 4 gives a rst example. The next section presents compositionality results for data abstraction and illustrates the applicability of the results by means of the veri cation of a router. The conclusion discusses further related work, especially that of Roscoe, whose book 18] contains a great variety of techniques to overcome the problem of state space complexity, and we discuss the issue of data independence.
Prerequisites
We start with a brief description of CSP-OZ and the speci c structure of the translated speci cations. The data abstraction techniques we suggest are tailored towards this speci c structure. The translation will be explained through an example, details can be found in 8]. Afterwards we brie y describe the semantics underlying the process algebra CSP. A summary of CSP operators can be found in the appendix, a more detailed introduction in 11].
CSP-OZ
CSP-OZ is an integrated formal method that allows for a description of static aspects (by means of Object-Z) as well as dynamic aspects (by means of the process algebra CSP). A CSP-OZ speci cation describes a system as a collection of interacting objects, each of which has a prescribed structure and behaviour. Communication takes place via channels in the style of CSP. In general, a CSP-OZ speci cation consists of a number of paragraphs, introducing classes, global variables, functions and types. CSP-OZ classes can be combined using the CSP operators parallel composition, external and internal choice and hiding; thus overriding the corresponding operators in Object-Z. In this paper, we will mainly be concerned with CSP-OZ classes, to be precise, with CSP processes which are translations of CSP-OZ classes. The speci c structure of these programs can best be understood with the original CSP-OZ class structure in mind, which is as follows: The rst part de nes the syntactic interface of the class, i.e. the channels which can be used for communication with the environment. The second part contains all CSP-declarations, de ning the dynamic behaviour of the class; for our pool: it may either input some new elements after which this has to be signalled to the environment or (2) output some elements. No reference to data in any kind occurs in the CSP part; all communications are of the form ch?x (a communication of the form ch!e would refer to some concrete data value). Thus also the output of our pool has the form out?x.
The remaining part of the class de nition contains Object-Z-declarations. The main part is the declaration of the state schema (here the state variable pool), the initial state schema (its initial value), and operation schemas. The de nition of an operation has to be divided into an (optional) enabling and an e ect schema. The enabling schema (e.g. enable out) is a predicate over the state variables of the class, and describes the states in which the operation can be executed (e.g. outputs are only possible when the pool is non-empty). Enable schemas are thus used to describe data-dependent behaviour. The e ect schema (a predicate over the state variables and input parameters) describes the e ect of an operation on the state space and the values of possible output parameters (the primed variables are used to describe the value of a variable in the next state, the -list lists all variables which are changed by the operation).
Structure of translated CSP-OZ speci cations
For the veri cation, every class of a CSP-OZ speci cation is translated into the de nition of a CSP process. When using such a de nition, we will also refer to this as the CSP process of an object, a particular instance of a class.
The translation preserves the clear separation between data and behaviour. The CSP part of the CSP-OZ speci cation remains unchanged while the Z part has to be translated into CSP. Intuitively, the behaviour of the Z part is as follows: in every state (speci c values of the state variables) one of the enabled operations may be taken and the resulting state is determined by the e ect of the operation. Thus the CSP translation of the Z part is an external choice over all class operations with their enabling conditions as guards. The e ect schemas, which are predicates in the CSP-OZ speci cation, are translated into functions from state space and input parameters to sets of possible new states and values of output parameters. The abbreviation (main) stands for the alphabet of the process main (the set of channel names occurring in it) and |~| DIV is a special internal choice operator capturing the case that the index set of the iterated |~| is empty, in this case the process diverges. The intuition behind the use of this operator is the following: if an operation is enabled but its e ect is not de ned for the current state (yielding an empty e ect set), the process behaves as completely undetermined, it diverges.
The structure of the translated class can be further simpli ed when there are no input or no output parameters of a channel, or when the e ect of an operation is deterministic, i.e. the e ect set contains a single value. None of our examples will use the general structure, most often the Z part is simply of the
The translation of the class Pool given above is:
CSP semantics
The standard semantic model of CSP is the failure-divergence model. The same model has been used in 7] to give a semantics to CSP-OZ, by de ning a failuredivergence semantics for the Z part. Thus a uniform semantics is achieved. An alternative weaker semantic model which is also supported by FDR is the trace model. We will use both models here. The trace model is su cient for studying safety properties, while for liveness properties (e.g. deadlock or livelock freedom) a more discriminating semantics has to be chosen. Traces record the possible runs of a process, failures additionally give sets of events that are refused after some run, and divergences describe the set of traces after which the process may diverge, i.e. perform an in nite number of internal events. Thus, given a set of events (typically of the form ch:v, where ch is a channel name and v a value), we have traces(P) 2 failures(P) 2 2 divergences(P) 2
These semantic models are used to compare processes and check properties on them. The most important comparison concept in CSP theory is re nement:
De nition 1. A CSP process P 1 is a failure-divergence re nement of a process P 2 (denoted P 2 v F P 1 ) if failures(P 2 ) failures(P 1 ) and divergences(P 2 ) divergences(P 1 ):
They are failure-divergence equivalent (P 1 = F P 2 ) if P 1 v F P 2 and P 2 v F P 1 .
If P 1 is a re nement of P 2 , it can be seen as an implementation of P 2 since it is more deterministic than P 2 . A weaker re nement notion is obtained when only the traces are used for comparison:
De nition 2. A CSP process P 1 is a trace re nement of a process P 2 (denoted P 2 v T P 1 ) if traces(P 2 ) traces(P 1 ).
Both re nement notions are compositional (or monotone): given two processes P 1 , P 2 and a CSP context C ], then P 1 v P 2 ) C P 1 ] v C P 2 ], where v 2 fv T ;v F g.
There are two possibilities for deriving the semantics of a CSP process: by a denotational semantics which compositionally computes traces, failures and divergences, or via a structured operational semantics which constructs a transition system for a process, from which traces, failures and divergences are computed. Both semantics are consistent: they compute the same traces, failures and divergences of a process. We refer to 18]) for details. A summary of CSP operators in FDR syntax can be found in the appendix. The two operators which will be used in our results are { parallel composition with sychronisation on some set of events A: jj A , and { renaming: R], which renames all events according to the renaming relation R.
We use general renaming relations, not just injective functions. As an example for a CSP process with renaming: Let P = a ! SKIP and R = f(a; b); (a; c)g, then P R] is equal to b ! SKIP 2 c ! SKIP.
Data abstraction
Since CSP-OZ speci cations may contain rather large amounts of data, the state space of the resulting CSP process can often be too large to be processed by FDR. Several techniques have already been proposed to overcome this problem; especially in the book of Roscoe 18] several methods can be found together with various application examples.
The technique we propose here is based on abstract interpretation of programs 4] and can be seen as complementing the other techniques. Abstract interpretation is a technique for program analysis which is often used in compiler design for static analysis (e.g. data-ow analysis, strictness analysis, etc.). The results of an abstract interpretation can for instance be used in type checking or optimisation. The idea of abstract interpretation is to interpret a program in an abstract domain using abstract operations. The main advantage is that the concrete program does not have to be executed while still being able to obtain information about its real execution. For veri cation of formal speci cations, the basis of abstract interpretation is to construct an abstract model of the specication on which abstract properties can be proven which give information on the concrete model 5, 1, 14] . For this, the data domain of the concrete program has to be abstracted and operations of the program are abstractly interpreted on the new data domain.
In holds, i.e. the concrete semantics of the new enable and e ects must equal the abstract semantics of the old ones. Furthermore channels have to be declared over the abstract domains. These changes can already be done in the CSP-OZ speci cation, the designer does not have to look at the CSP code at all.
So far, we are free to use whatever abstract interpretation we want. Of course, the abstracted system should somehow re ect the behaviour of the concrete system: we want to abstractly observe the events of the concrete system. To Depending on the choice of abstraction functions, it may not be possible to nd an optimal abstract interpretation. Optimality requires abstraction functions which guarantee that all concrete states which are abstracted into the same abstract state abstractly behave "the same". Note that every optimal abstraction is safe. Tool support for proving optimalityor safety of interpretations is available in the form of theorem provers for Z 13,15] .
Given a speci cation S, we let S S refer to a safe and S O to an optimal abstraction of S.
What is now the relationship between the behaviour of the abstracted and the concrete system? Our goal is to express this relationship completely in terms of process algebra notions. This enables us to use all of the process algebra theory for further manipulation of the result. In the abstracted system we can, of course, only observe communications with abstract values. This is the nature of abstract interpretation, we have lost some information about the concrete system, in our case the concrete values of communication. Thus we can only compare the abstracted system with the renamed concrete system: Most of these steps in the veri cation are tool-supported or even automatic. Nevertheless, the crucial part of abstraction, nding good abstract domains and abstraction functions, is still left to the user. 1] gives some heuristics for the choice of abstraction functions.
First example: an optimal abstraction
The following example gives a rst impression of data abstractions for CSP-OZ. It is an optimal abstraction, that reduces an equivalence check between an in nite state and a nite state speci cation to an equivalence check between two nite state systems. Although both systems are very simple, this already shows the potential of abstract interpretation.
Both speci cations describe a simple clock with alternating tick and tock events. While in the rst clock the alternation is encoded by the usage of enabling predicates (the Z part uses a counter), Hence an equivalence proof of both clocks by separate data and process re nement proofs is not possible. FDR can also not be used since the state space of the rst clock is in nite. We now apply the following abstraction function h to the rst clock h : k 7 ! 0 if even(k) 1 if odd(k) and replace the enabling and e ect operations by their following abstract versions: (+1) A (k) := (+1)(k)mod2, even A (k) := even(k); odd A (k) := odd(k). This is an optimal abstract interpretation for Clock1 with respect to h. Note that in this case no abstraction function for channel values is needed and thus the renaming function G of Theorem 1 is empty. Thus we get the rst result: Clock1 O = F Clock1. The abstracted clock is now nite state, thus we can use FDR for checking whether Clock1 O = F Clock2 (the answer is yes), and this implies Clock1 = F Clock2. This rather simple example (without input and output parameters) also reveals close similarities between data abstraction and data re nement (which is the standard re nement notion within Z). The data abstraction we have used here is in fact also a valid data re nement (from Clock1 to Clock1 O and vice versa). In general, in our setting every optimal data abstraction can also be seen as a data re nement plus a renaming.
Compositionality
In this section, we will be concerned with the issue of compositionality of data abstractions. Two aspects will be considered here: { combining abstraction results for di erent objects of a system, and { combining di erent abstractions of the same object.
The results we get here are formulated within the traces model, thus we only deal with safety properties.
Composing objects
In general, we will not be interested in a single object alone, but in a system which is composed out of a number of objects operating in parallel. Thus we have to extend our abstraction theorem to parallel compositions of objects. Two aspects are helpful for this extension: the rst is the fact that the abstraction theorem for objects is completely formulated within process algebra theory, and the second is the compositionality (monotonicity) of both trace and failure re nement.
Consider a system S composed out of two objects S 1 and S 2 operating in parallel with synchronisation on some set A : S = S 1 jj A S 2 . So far, we are able to prove properties of S 1 and S 2 alone by for instance using some safe abstraction with respect to abstraction functions h 1 ;g 1 , h 2 ;g 2 respectively. By our abstraction theorem, we know that S S When the abstraction functions of the components agree on the joint events of the components, we can look at the abstracted system as S S = S S 1 jj G1(A) S S 2 . Compositionality of trace re nement already gives us the following result:
However, the left hand side is not the system we are actually interested in, namely S 1 jj A S 2 . The next proposition helps us towards this goal. Proposition 1. Let f : ! be a renaming function and A a set of events such that a 2 A , f (a) 2 f (A) holds; let P 1 ;P 2 be CSP processes. Then
All renaming functions G generated by some abstraction function g have the above stated property, thus we immediately get:
Combining these two parts, we get the following compositionality result: Thus we have extended our abstraction theorem for safe abstractions to parallel compositions of objects. Unfortunately, this result cannot be extended to optimal abstractions in the sense, that we may replace trace re nement by failures equivalence. Proposition 1 does not even hold for trace equivalence since the concrete components may fail to synchronise while their abstractions communicate.
Combining abstractions
Besides compositions of objects, we are also interested in composing di erent abstraction results of the same object. The idea is to use di erent abstractions to prove di erent properties of an object and afterwards combine these abstractions to show that also their combination holds.
Consider an object S and two di erent safe abstractions wrt. h 1 ;g 1 and wrt. h 2 ;g 2 . We prove two properties of the object via abstractions, using FDR to . When the abstractions have been carefully chosen (and when they t together well), Prop might indeed be the property of interest. The following example demonstrates the use of both kinds of compositionality results.
Illustrating example
The example is a 1-to-2 n router with n stages (Figure 1 shows a router with two stages). Stage i contains 2 i switches which one input (in) and two outputs (out0; out1) each. The messages which are send through the router consist of an address (a binary number of length n) and a data part. The address is used for routing: a switch at stage i looks at the i-th bit of the address; when it is 0 it sends the message to the upper channel (out0), otherwise to the lower channel (out1). Receipt of messages is acknowledged (ack) and the switches delay the next input until an acknowledge has been received (rack). Thus the router contains at most one message. The following CSP speci cation in CSP-OZ form describes a router with 2 stages. 
The routing within a switch is encoded in the enabling conditions of output communications out0 and out1. The ordering of events ( rst input, then output, receive acknowledge and acknowledge itself) is encoded in the CSP process main. The switches are combined into router by renaming the corresponding ports appropriately and synchronising on them 2 . The output ports of the second stage are renamed into out0; out1; out2 and out3.
The property to be veri ed is a safety property: every message input to the router with address a and data d is, if it is delivered at all, correctly delivered at output port num(a) (the number with binary encoding a). However, it may not be possible to use FDR to prove this property since the router may be too large to be processed with FDR when the domain of Data is large. Two abstractions are possible: abstracting from the data, i.e. mapping all di erent data values onto one single value (functions h 1 ;g 1 ), or abstracting from the address, mapping all addresses onto a single one (functions h 2 ;g 2 ). The rst abstraction allows for an optimal abstract interpretation of enable and e ects (the enabling conditions are independent of the data), the latter only for a safe abstraction. For the optimal abstraction the only change in the CSP code is a change of the de nition of Data, for the safe abstraction we have to change Adr (to a single-value type <0>) and the enabling conditions for out0 and out1 which are now both true. We now separately prove two properties:
{ if a message with address a is received, the next message is delivered at port 
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a data abstraction technique for CSP-OZ, which was based on the idea of abstract interpretation of speci cations. We have shown how properties of concrete speci cations are preserved by abstraction by relating the abstract to the renamed concrete speci cation. We studied compositionality of class abstractions and showed how abstraction results can be combined to give more information about the concrete system. The advantage of our method is that it is both simple to carry out (abstraction requires only small local changes in the CSP-OZ speci cation) and the results are easy to interpret. Speci cation, veri cation and abstraction is formulated within the CSP setting. So far, the object-oriented nature of the speci cation language has played no role in the veri cation. We intend to further investigate how the object-oriented structuring of speci cations can be exploited to facilitate veri cation.
Related work. Besides the work already discussed in the introduction, we want to further comment on some related work, especially on the work of Roscoe, both because it deals with CSP and because of its great variety of techniques. The book 18] presents several methods that can be used to analyse CSP programs which are per se too large to be processed with FDR. These techniques include { abstraction techniques based on hiding, { local deadlock analysis and { data independent property checks.
Especially the last point is of interest for data abstraction: data independence ( rst studied by Wolper 23] ) is concerned with the behaviour of programs independent of some of their parameters. For instance, one might be interested in knowing whether a bu er speci cation works like a bu er independently of the stored elements. Roscoe 18] reports on some work (together with Lasic) that allows to compute thresholds on the size of data domains used for particular parameters, such that it is su cient to check a property on a given program with parameters instantiated with a domain of this size and conclude correctness for all instantiations with larger domains. This could very much facilitate correctness checks for CSP programs, since it is to be expected that usually a data independent program with a small data domain already exhibits all the "relevant" behaviour. The router example could pro t from this technique; it is possibly su cient to check the trace re nement on a domain of Data of size 2.
The clock example is, however, not amenable to such techniques since it is not data independent: it contains tests on data values (even; odd).
Data independence has also been an issue in other work on veri cation; a very interesting approach in a process algebraic setting is 12]. Jonsson and Parrow study programs which are completely data independent (no modi cation on data, no testing of values) and show that bisimulation is decidable on this class of systems, even when the data domain is in nite. Their idea could possibily also be used for re nement, but is limited to this restricted class.
B Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds via the operational semantics of CSP, i.e. via the generated transition systems and their traces, failures and divergences. We let denote a set of visible actions, a distinguished internal action such that 6 Note the di erent transition relations used in the de nition. A relation is thus not necessarily a bisimulation if both and ?1 are simulations. The unusual de nition of = a ) (no further invisible actions after a) allows for a more convenient proof, we just have to consider the states after one visible step and no further internal moves. This is su cient for trace re nement. Some of the internal choices may have already been resolved (in case of an empty e ect set, this might also lead to divergence), while others are not yet taken. The proof is similar to the above proof, with the di erence that we now have to consider single steps (therefore we get all the above terms in our bisimulation relation), and that now the abstract interpretation of the enable and e ect predicates match exactly the concrete interpretations. A transition can either be 1) taking an internal choice (resolving u) or 2) a divergence. For the divergence we have: e ect chi(d;m) is empty if and only if e ect ch A i (h (d );gi(m ) ) is empty. Concerning the resolution of choices: assume that the resolves the choice over all possible values in the e ect set of some channel ch i in the concrete system. Then ch i is enabled in the current abstract as well as concrete state. Hence the event occurs in both systems and the resulting processes are in again.
